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Interpretation of Ambiguous Information: Can Generalized Anxiety Disorder Be 
Distinguished From Other Anxiety Disorders?  
Kristin Anderson 
Anxious individuals interpret ambiguity negatively. There is evidence that this 
interpretation bias is disorder specific. For example, those with panic disorder rate 
ambiguous physiological sensations more negatively than do individuals with social 
phobia. As generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) is characterized by an intolerance of 
various uncertainty-inducing situations, negative interpretations of ambiguity might be 
pronounced in individuals with GAD. The goal of the current study was to compare the 
tendency to interpret ambiguous situations and pictures negatively in individuals with 
GAD, individuals with other anxiety disorders (ANX), and in non-anxious individuals. 
An additional goal was to explore the extent to which intolerance of uncertainty (IU), 
state anxiety, and their interaction contribute to this tendency. Results showed that 
compared to the non-anxious group, the clinical groups reported more concern for all 
situation types (e.g., positive, negative, and ambiguous), and rated ambiguous and neutral 
(but not positive or negative) pictures as less pleasant. The clinical groups reported 
similar levels of concern for ambiguous situations; however, the ANX group rated 
ambiguous pictures as less pleasant than did the GAD group. Finally, IU predicted more 
negative interpretations of ambiguous situations and pictures. The interaction between IU 
and state anxiety revealed that IU predicted ratings of ambiguous situations only at low 
levels of state anxiety. Results suggest that GAD may not be distinguishable from other 
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anxiety disorders with regard to interpretations of ambiguous stimuli, and that IU may be 
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Interpretation of Ambiguous Information: Can Generalized Anxiety Disorder Be 
Distinguished From Other Anxiety Disorders?  
The goal of this study was to investigate whether the tendency to interpret 
ambiguous information negatively is more pronounced in individuals with generalized 
anxiety disorder (GAD) compared to individuals with anxiety disorders other than GAD. 
In addition, the objective was to understand the extent to which intolerance of 
uncertainty, state anxiety and their interaction predict appraisals of ambiguous 
information. 
Anxiety and the Interpretation of Ambiguous Information 
It is well established that anxious individuals interpret ambiguous information in a 
negative fashion (Calvo & Castillo, 2001; MacLeod & Cohen, 1993; Ouimet, Gawronski, 
& Dozois, 2009). More specifically, this phenomenon exists in individuals with GAD 
(MacLeod & Rutherford, 2004), social phobia (Franklin, Huppert, Langner, Leiberg, & 
Foa, 2005; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997), panic disorder (Clark et al., 1997; McNally, 1994), 
specific phobia (Becker & Rinck, 2004), post-traumatic stress disorder (Elwood, 
Williams, Olatunji, & Lohr, 2007), as well as in those with high levels of trait anxiety 
(Macleod & Cohen). Although various methods have been used to assess this 
phenomenon, one of the more common methods involves the use of ambiguously written 
statements or scenarios (e.g., Wilson, MacLeod, & Campbell, 2007). For example, Butler 
and Mathews (1983) asked anxious, depressed, and control participants to interpret 
ambiguously written scenarios (e.g., “suppose you wake up with a start in the middle of 
the night thinking you heard a noise but all is quiet”) and found that anxious and 
depressed participants interpreted the scenarios more negatively than did the control 
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participants. In a similar study, Huppert, Pasupuleti, Foa, and Mathews (2007) compared 
high and low socially anxious individuals on their interpretation of socially ambiguous 
sentences (the last word of each sentence was missing; e.g., “As you walk to the podium, 
you notice your heart racing, which means you are _____”). Participants were asked to 
generate as many words as possible to complete the sentence, and to identify the word 
they believed best completed the sentence. Results showed that compared to the low 
socially anxious individuals, the high socially anxious individuals generated more 
negative words, and were more likely to select a negative word as the word that best 
completed the sentence. 
 Another method utilized to assess interpretation style is the homophone task, 
where participants are asked to spell a word they have heard. Each word presented to 
participants has two possible interpretations, one of which is negative (e.g., die/dye). The 
common finding with this task is that relative to non-anxious participants, anxious 
participants tend to spell the word in its threatening version (Eysenck, MacLeod, & 
Mathews, 1987).  Other studies have utilized ambiguous video clips where an actor 
approaches the camera and comments on the individual‟s behaviour or belongings. Some 
of the video clips are positive (e.g., “I really like your shoes”), some are negative (e.g., 
“That is a horrible haircut”), and some are ambiguous (e.g., “That is an interesting shirt 
you have on”). Consistent with the findings obtained with other types of tasks, results of 
studies using ambiguous video clips typically reveal that anxious individuals interpret the 
ambiguous videos more negatively than do non-anxious individuals (see e.g., Amir, 
Beard, & Bower, 2005).  
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Although there are many tasks to assess interpretive biases, tasks consisting of 
pictorial stimuli are not commonly used. To our knowledge, only one study to date has 
employed digital photographs of various types of situations to elicit interpretations in 
adult populations (i.e., Koerner, Hedayati, & Dugas, 2004). Some have argued that the 
use of lexical stimuli (e.g., written scenarios) is not ideal when attempting to elicit 
cognitive processing biases due to its diminished ecological validity (Radomsky & 
Rachman, 2004). Considering that individuals rarely encounter written ambiguous texts, 
and often encounter visually ambiguous images, the use of ambiguous pictures is 
particularly important, and might be more apt to elucidate cognitive processing biases. 
Given the relative non-use of pictorial stimuli, and their potential importance, the 
effectiveness of such stimuli to elicit interpretive biases warrants further study.  
Specificity of Interpretation of Ambiguous Information 
Although it appears that the tendency to interpret ambiguous information 
negatively is characteristic of anxiety in general (rather than one anxiety disorder in 
particular), interpretation biases of certain types of ambiguous information are relatively 
disorder specific. For example, compared to individuals with elevated levels of anxiety 
and dysphoria, those diagnosed with social phobia rate socially ambiguous interactions 
more negatively (Amir et al., 2005). In addition, individuals diagnosed with panic 
disorder rate internal ambiguous stimuli (e.g., heart palpitations) as more threatening than 
do individuals diagnosed with social phobia (Harvey, Richards, Dziadosz, & Swindell, 
1993). Interestingly, these two groups of individuals do not differ in their interpretations 
of externally ambiguous information, but do rate this information as more threatening 
compared to non-anxious individuals (Harvey et al.).  
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Intolerance of Uncertainty and GAD 
Intolerance of uncertainty (IU) is defined as a dispositional characteristic resulting 
from negative beliefs about uncertainty and its implications (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007). 
The weight of the evidence suggests that individuals with GAD have higher levels of IU 
than individuals with other anxiety disorders, who in turn appear to have higher levels 
than individuals with no psychological condition (Ladouceur et al., 1999). Since 
individuals with GAD worry about a number of different topics (American Psychiatric 
Association [APA], 2000), they might find various, if not most types of uncertainty-
inducing stimuli, aversive. In contrast, individuals with other anxiety disorders might find 
specific types of ambiguous information aversive, but might not be as concerned about 
other types of ambiguity. For example, a person with social phobia might tend to react 
negatively to socially ambiguous information, but may respond quite well to 
physiologically ambiguous information. Conversely, a person with panic disorder might 
be quite intolerant to physiologically ambiguous stimuli, but may be relatively tolerant of 
socially ambiguous stimuli. If individuals with GAD are intolerant of almost all types of 
uncertainty-inducing situations, then the tendency to interpret ambiguity negatively might 
be especially characteristic of this population.  
Cognitive Theories and Information Processing 
To date, much of the research on cognitive processing has examined biases in 
anxious individuals or in those with a psychological disorder (Calvo & Castillo, 2001; 
MacLeod & Mathews, 1991). Put differently, most researchers have examined the 
relation between symptoms and information processing, which is not entirely consistent 
with cognitive theories of psychopathology. Cognitive theories generally propose that 
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fundamental beliefs (or schemata) have the greatest influence on information processing, 
which in turn mediates the relation between beliefs and the expression of symptoms (e.g., 
Clark & Beck, 2010). Although few studies to date have investigated the extent to which 
beliefs influence cognitive processing, some researchers have begun to examine this 
relation. For example, Teachman (2005) examined the relationship between anxiety 
sensitivity and interpretation biases. Anxiety sensitivity refers to the fear of the 
physiological symptoms of anxiety (e.g., racing heart), and has been shown to precede 
and predict the onset of panic disorder (Schmidt, Lerew, & Jackson, 1999). Teachman 
presented ambiguous scenarios to individuals high and low on anxiety sensitivity and 
found evidence for an interpretation bias in the high, but not the low anxiety sensitivity 
group. After reading the ambiguous scenarios, individuals high on anxiety sensitivity 
selected threat-related interpretations more often than benign interpretations, and rated 
threat-related interpretations as more believable compared to individuals low in anxiety 
sensitivity. Furthermore, results remained significant even when individuals with a prior 
history of panic attacks were excluded from analyses. Therefore, it appears that the 
tendency to interpret ambiguity negatively is not simply a bi-product of anxiety, but is 
associated with cognitive vulnerability for panic disorder (Teachman). With regard to 
GAD, Dugas and colleagues (2005) found that IU was a unique predictor of negative 
appraisals of ambiguous information above and beyond demographic and symptom 
variables (e.g., worry, anxiety, and depression). Similarly, Koerner and Dugas (2008) 
found that individuals who are intolerant of uncertainty interpreted ambiguous situations 
more negatively than those who are tolerant of uncertainty. Although the two 
aforementioned studies provide important information as to the relation between negative 
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beliefs about uncertainty and interpretation biases, the extent to which this relation is 
influenced by the presence of certain symptoms remains unclear. Given the extant 
literature, it is conceivable that IU might interact with anxiety to lead to greater biases in 
information processing. 
Goals 
The general goal of the current study was to compare the tendency to interpret 
ambiguous information negatively in individuals with GAD and in individuals with other 
anxiety disorders. More specifically, the first goal was to investigate whether or not 
individuals with GAD interpret ambiguous stimuli (lexical and pictorial) in a more 
negative manner. The study also aimed to examine the extent to which IU, state anxiety, 
and their interaction contribute to the tendency to interpret ambiguous information 
negatively. 
Hypotheses 1a and 1b 
1a) The GAD group (GAD) and the non-GAD anxious group (ANX) will rate all 
types of situations (ambiguous, negative, and positive) as being more 
concerning than will the healthy control group (CTRL). 
1b) The GAD group and the ANX group will rate all type of pictures (ambiguous, 
negative, positive, and neutral) as being less pleasant than will the CTRL 
group.  
Hypotheses 2a and 2b 
2a) The GAD group will report more concern for ambiguous situations (and not 
for negative and positive situations) than will the ANX group.  
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2b) The GAD group will rate ambiguous pictures (and not positive, negative, or 
neutral pictures) as being less pleasant than will the ANX group. 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b 
3a) Using the total sample, level of IU, level of state anxiety, and their interaction 
will each uniquely predict negative appraisals of ambiguous information. 
More specifically, higher levels of IU, higher levels of state anxiety, and the 
interaction between the two variables will each be positively associated with 
higher levels of concern for ambiguous situations.  
3b) Using the total sample, level of IU, level of state anxiety, and their interaction 
will each uniquely predict negative appraisals of ambiguous pictures. More 
specifically, higher levels of IU, higher levels of state anxiety, and the 
interaction between the two variables will each be negatively associated with 




A total of 108 Francophone adults took part in the study. This total encompassed 
three groups: (1) 39 individuals with a primary diagnosis of GAD (GAD: 32 female, 
mean age = 39.61, SD = 12.86); (2) 32 individuals with a primary anxiety disorder other 
than GAD (ANX: 14 female, mean age = 29.75, SD = 9.38); and (3) 37 individuals with 
no psychiatric diagnosis (CTRL: 23 female, mean age = 27.00, SD = 8.68). Ethnic 
composition was the following: 82.1% White/European, 10.3% Middle Eastern, and 
5.1% “other” in the GAD group (2.6% missing); 78% White/European, 6.3% Middle 
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Eastern, 3.1% Hispanic, and 6.3% “other” in the ANX group (6.3% missing); and 75.7% 
White/European, 2.7% Hispanic, and 2.7% Asian in the CTRL group (18.9% missing). In 
the GAD group, 68.4% had a Bachelor‟s degree, 15.8% had a CEGEP degree or 
certificate, and 15.4% had a high school diploma (.4% missing). In the ANX group, 
24.4% had a Bachelor‟s degree, 27.5% had a CEGEP degree or certificate, and 34.4% 
had a high school diploma (13.7% missing). In the CTRL group, 45.9% had a Bachelor‟s 
degree, 37.8% had a CEGEP degree or certificate, and 10.8% had a high school diploma 
(16.3% missing). In the GAD group, secondary (subclinical) conditions consisted of 
specific phobia (n = 13), depression (n = 9), panic disorder with or without agoraphobia 
(n = 9), social phobia (n = 7), obsessive-compulsive disorder (n = 4), and substance abuse 
(n = 1).  In the ANX group, the primary diagnoses consisted of social phobia (n = 12), 
panic disorder with or without agoraphobia (n = 14), and obsessive-compulsive disorder 
(n = 6), whereas the secondary (subclinical) conditions consisted of GAD (n = 13), 
specific phobia (n = 9), depression (n = 6), panic disorder with or without agoraphobia (n 
= 2), social phobia (n = 4), obsessive-compulsive disorder (n = 3), and agoraphobia (n = 
1). The mean duration of the primary disorder was 11.61 years (SD = 11.87) in the GAD 
group, and 7.85 years (SD = 9.14) in the ANX group. Additionally, the severity of the 
primary diagnosis was 5.8 on the 9-point (0-8) Clinician‟s Severity Rating of the Anxiety 
Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV (ADIS-IV; DiNardo, Brown, & Barlow, 1994) 
for the GAD group, and 5.4 for the ANX group. Finally, 22 individuals in the GAD 
group, 22 individuals in the ANX group, and 0 individuals in the CTRL group were 
taking medication at the time of testing. Medication type in both clinical groups was 
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primarily a serotonin reuptake inhibitor (GAD; n = 12, ANX; n = 19), and less commonly 
a benzodiazepine (GAD; n = 10, ANX; n = 3). 
Procedure 
Participants with an Anxiety Disorder 
All participants in the GAD and ANX groups were recruited from the Anxiety 
Disorders Clinic at Sacré-Cœur Hospital in Montreal. These individuals were informed 
about the nature of the study, and if interested, signed a consent form (see Appendix A 
for consent form). Potential participants were then administered the Mini International 
Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI 4.4; Sheehan et al., 1994) by a psychiatrist to assess 
eligibility, and if eligible, were administered the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule 
for DSM-IV (ADIS-IV; DiNardo et al., 1994) by a psychologist. Following these two 
independent interviews, all members of the research team (including the psychiatrist and 
psychologist who administered the interviews) met to arrive at a final diagnostic 
impression. Individuals who received a primary diagnosis of GAD or another anxiety 
disorder, and who met all other inclusion criteria were invited to participate in the study. 
Inclusion criteria consisted of: (1) a primary disorder of either GAD, social phobia, panic 
disorder (with or without agoraphobia) or obsessive-compulsive disorder; (2) the primary 
disorder rated greater than or equal to 4/8 on the Clinician‟s Severity Rating (CSR) of the 
ADIS-IV; (3) no secondary diagnosis greater than or equal to a CSR of 4/8; (4) absence 
of substance abuse; (5) no evidence of suicidal intent; (6) no current or past history of 
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or organic mental disorder; (7) no anxiety symptoms due 
to a general medical problem (e.g., hyperthyroidism); and (8) no benzodiazepines 
consumed at least 12 hours prior to testing.  
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Following the team meeting, all participants were informed by telephone as to 
whether or not they were included in the study. Of note, inclusion or exclusion from this 
study did not interfere with regular clinic activities for individuals receiving treatment at 
the Anxiety Disorders Clinic. Included participants met again with the team psychologist 
to complete the cognitive tasks along with the various study questionnaires. At this 
session, participants began by completing the Subjective Units of Distress Scale (SUDS) 
and were asked to complete the Affective Picture Rating Task (APRT; Koerner et al., 
2004) and the Ambiguous/Unambiguous Situations Diary (AUSD; Davey, Hampton, 
Farrell, & Davidson, 1992). The order of the cognitive tasks was counterbalanced across 
all participants. After completing these tasks, participants filled out the remainder of the 
questionnaires, were debriefed, and were thanked for their participation. In total, 109 
individuals received information about the study and expressed interest in participating. 
Of those 109 anxious individuals, 38 were not included in the final sample for various 
reasons: 9 withdrew their consent, 3 had scheduling difficulties, 5 were not the object of a 
consensus regarding the primary disorder, 7 did not have an anxiety disorder, and 14 had 
a clinically significant secondary disorder. This left 71 clinical participants, 39 with a 
primary diagnosis of GAD, and 32 with an anxiety disorder other than GAD.  
Non-Clinical Participants 
Non-clinical participants were recruited through advertisements placed around the 
university campus. Interested potential participants called the laboratory for more 
information, and if still interested were invited to the lab for testing. Upon arriving, all 
participants signed the consent form (see Appendix B for consent form) and were 
administered the ADIS-IV by a research assistant to ensure non-clinical status. 
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Participants then completed the SUDS, followed by the APRT and the AUSD 
(counterbalanced), and all study questionnaires. Afterwards, participants were debriefed 
about the study goals, and were compensated $20 for their time. 
Diagnostic Interviews 
The Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV (ADIS-IV; DiNardo et al., 
1994) is a diagnostic interview that assesses for anxiety, mood, substance use, 
somatoform, and psychotic disorders, as well as for other medical problems. Axis I 
disorders are rated on the 9-point Clinician‟s Severity Rating scale (CSR) from 0 (absent 
or none) to 8 (very severe or very severely disturbing/disabling). A CSR rating of 4 
(moderate or definitely disturbing/disabling) represents the score at which a disorder is 
considered to be clinically significant. The ADIS-IV has shown good inter-rater 
reliability with regards to excessive worry (r = .73), uncontrollability of worry (r = .78), 
associated symptoms of GAD (r = .83), as well as the CSR (r = .72; Brown, DiNardo, 
Lehman, & Campbell, 2001).   
The Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview, version 4.4 (MINI; Sheehan 
et al., 1994) is a diagnostic interview assessing for the presence or absence of Axis I 
disorders.  The CSR was added to the MINI in order to obtain a specific indicator of 
severity (as opposed to presence vs. absence), as well as to calculate inter-rater reliability 
for the severity of diagnosed conditions with the MINI and the ADIS-IV. The MINI has 
shown good inter-rater agreement with regards to the diagnosis of GAD over a 2-day 
period with different interviewers, κ = .78 (Sheehan et al., 1997). 
Information Processing Tasks 
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The Ambiguous Unambiguous Situations Diary (AUSD; Davey et al., 1992) is a 
task designed to assess interpretive biases. The AUSD is comprised of 28 diary-like 
situations of which 7 are negative, 7 are positive, and 14 are ambiguous. Participants are 
instructed to read the diary entries as though they were their own, and to rate their level 
of concern for each situation on a 5-point scale where 1 = not at all concerned and 5 = 
very concerned. The rationale behind this task is that if an individual interprets an 
ambiguous situation negatively, he/she will report more concern for that situation. 
Koerner and Dugas (2008) found evidence of convergent validity for the ambiguous 
situations of this task as they correlated with measures of worry, anxiety, and depression. 
The AUSD has been used in previous studies assessing interpretive biases (Davey et al.; 
Dugas et al., 2005; Koerner & Dugas). The AUSD is presented in Appendix C. 
The Affective Picture Rating Task (APRT; Koerner et al., 2004) is a computerized 
task designed to assess interpretive biases. This task was designed by members of our 
research team and has been used in a previous study (Koerner et al.).  The task begins 
with a set of instructions indicating that various pictures will be presented on the 
computer monitor one at a time. Following each presentation, the participant must 
indicate the pleasantness of the picture using the keyboard where 1 = very unpleasant and 
9 = very pleasant. After reading these instructions, participants are given three practice 
trials to ensure that the task is well understood. Participants then proceed with 60 
experimental trials. All trials commence with a warning slide displayed for 5000ms, 
which indicates that the next picture is coming up. Following the warning slide, a picture 
is displayed on the computer screen for 3000ms. In keeping with Koerner and colleagues, 
a time interval of 3000ms was utilized, as their study was the only one to date assessing 
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appraisal biases using the APRT. Koerner and colleagues selected 3000ms to ensure that 
the picture would be attended to, but also to limit the potential elaboration and re-
processing that can occur during prolonged exposure.  The pictorial stimuli for the APRT 
were selected from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & 
Cuthbert, 2001), which is a set of standardized color photographs depicting various 
scenes. To arrive at a final set of negative, positive, ambiguous, and neutral pictures for 
the current study, ten judges (who were blind to the goals of the study) pilot tested 131 
IAPS photographs. The judges rated the pleasantness of all 131 pictures (1 = very 
unpleasant, 9 = very pleasant), and classified each picture into one of the four possible 
categories (pleasant, negative, neutral, or ambiguous). Fifteen pictures per category were 
then selected based on high inter-rater agreement on their classification. Examples of 
positive, negative, neutral, and ambiguous pictures are presented in Appendices D 
through G.  
An IBM personal desktop computer with a 17-inch colour monitor was used to 
present the APRT, and E-Prime Version 2.2 (Psychology Software Tools Inc) was used 
to program the APRT.  All photographs were presented with dimensions of 7.11 X 5.33 
inches, and were displayed at a resolution of 72 X 72 dots per inch. 
Self-Report Questionnaires 
The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & 
Borkovec, 1990) is a 16-item measure that assesses the tendency to experience excessive 
and uncontrollable worry. The PSWQ has demonstrated excellent internal consistency, α 
= .91 to .95, and good test-retest reliability over 2 to 10 weeks, r = .74 to .93. Moreover, 
the PSWQ has shown evidence of convergent validity with measures of anxiety, r = .64, 
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as well as divergent validity with measures of thrill seeking, r = -.20 (Meyer et al.). 
Internal consistency was α = .91 in the two clinical groups, and α = .87 in the CTRL 
group. 
The Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & 
Ladouceur, 1994) is a 27-item measure assessing beliefs about uncertainty, with higher 
scores reflecting more negative beliefs about uncertainty.  The IUS has shown excellent 
internal consistency, α = .91, and good test-retest reliability over 5 weeks, r = .78 (Dugas, 
Freeston, & Ladouceur, 1997). The IUS consists of two factors, the first being that 
uncertainty has negative behavioural and self-referent implications, and the second being 
that uncertainty is unfair and spoils everything. Both factors have demonstrated excellent 
internal consistency, α = .90 to .92 (Sexton & Dugas, 2009). Internal consistency for the 
total score was α = .96 in the two clinical groups, and α = .90 in the CTRL group. 
The Padua Inventory - Washington State University Revision (PI-WSUR; Burns, 
Keortge, Formea, & Sternberger, 1996) is a 39-item measure of obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms. The PI-WSUR shows evidence of discriminant validity, as it is more closely 
related to measures of obsessive-compulsive disorder than to measures of worry (e.g., 
PSWQ). The PI-WSUR is comprised of the following 5 subscales: the Contamination 
Obsessions and Washing Compulsions subscale, the Dressing/Grooming Compulsions 
subscale, the Checking Compulsions subscale, the Obsessional Impulse to Harm Self or 
Others subscale, and the Obsessional Thoughts about Harm to Self/Others subscale.  
Internal consistency for the subscales ranges from α = .77 to .88. Test-retest reliability 
over 6-7 months for the 5 subscales ranges from r = .61 to .84 (Burns et al.). Internal 
consistency was α = .94 in the two clinical groups, and α = .87 in the CTRL group. 
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Internal consistencies for the subscales ranged from α = .58 to .92 in the clinical groups, 
and α = .44 to .85 in the CTRL group. 
The Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; Connor, Davidson, & Churchill, 2000) 
contains 17 items addressing the core features of social phobia (fear and avoidance of 
social situations, and physiological symptoms). The measure has good internal 
consistency in samples of individuals with social phobia, α = .87 to .94, and in samples of 
individuals without social phobia, α = .82 to .90. The SPIN shows evidence of convergent 
and divergent validity as it correlates more strongly with other measures of social phobia 
than it does with measures of blood injury phobia (Connor et al.). Internal consistency 
was α = .94 in the two clinical groups, and α = .92 in the CTRL group. 
The Body Sensations Questionnaire (BSQ; Chambless, Caputo, Bright, & 
Gallagher, 1984) is a 17-item measure assessing fear of bodily sensations. The BSQ has 
demonstrated very good internal consistency, α = .87, as well as good test-retest 
reliability over a 31 day period, r = .67 (Chambless et al.). Internal consistency was α = 
.93 in the two clinical groups, and α = .91 in the CTRL group. 
The Agoraphobic Cognitions Questionnaire (ACQ: Chambless et al., 1984) is a 
14-item measure of the presence of various anxiety-related cognitions. The ACQ has 
demonstrated very good internal consistency, α = .87, and good test-retest reliability over 
a 31 day period, r = .75 (Chambless et al.). Internal consistency was α = .78 in the 
clinical groups, and α = .75 in the CTRL group.  
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait version (STAI-T; Spielberger, 1983) is a 
20-item measure assessing an individual‟s tendency to experience anxiety. Test-retest 
reliability of the STAI-T ranges from r = .73 to .86 (Spielberger), and the internal 
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consistency has been shown to be very good (α = .89; Bieling, Antony, & Swinson, 
1998). Internal consistency was α = .89 in the two clinical groups, and α = .86 in the 
CTRL group. 
The Beck Depression Inventory- Second Edition (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 
1996) consists of 21 items addressing depressive symptomatology. High internal 
consistency has been found in both student and outpatient samples (α = .93, α = .92). The 
BDI-II has shown evidence of convergent validity as it correlates with measures of 
hopelessness (r = .68). A factor analysis of the BDI-II yielded a two factor solution, with 
the first factor representing the cognitive-affective dimension and the second factor 
capturing the somatic-vegetative dimension of depression (Dozois, Dobson, & Ahnberg, 
1998). Internal consistency was α = .87 in the two clinical groups, and α = .86 in the 
CTRL group.   
The Subjective Units of Distress Scale (SUDS; Wolpe, 1958) was used to assess 
state levels of anxiety, sadness, irritability, well-being, and fatigue. Participants rated the 
extent to which they were experiencing each of the 5 emotions/states on a scale from 0 
(absent) to 100 (extreme). 
All self-report questionnaires are presented in Appendices H through P. 
Results 
Interrater agreement between primary diagnoses from the ADIS-IV and MINI was 
calculated. Agreement was specified as (1) same primary diagnosis, and (2) no greater 
than 1 point difference in the severity rating of the primary diagnosis. Using these 
criteria, 73% agreement was obtained.  
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A one-way ANOVA with group (GAD, ANX, CTRL) as the independent variable 
and age as the dependent variable produced a statistically significant result, F(2,103) = 
14.57, p < .001. Post hoc analyses showed that the GAD group was older (mean age = 
39.61, SD = 12.85) than both the ANX group (mean age = 29.75, SD = 9.38) and the 
CTRL group (mean age = 27.00, SD = 8.68). However, the ANX group and CTRL group 
were not different in terms of age. Chi square tests showed that the groups differed 
significantly in terms of sex, χ2(2) = 12.55, p = .001. Follow-up tests showed that the 
GAD group accounted for this difference as the chi squared statistic was no longer 
significant when the GAD group was excluded from the analysis.  Given these 
differences, age and sex were added as covariates in the analyses for the first two 
hypotheses. The two clinical groups did not differ in terms of the duration of the primary 
disorder, t(56) = 1.32, p = .194, nor were they different in terms of medication use χ2(1) = 
1.14, p = .287. There was however a trend suggesting that the primary disorder was more 
severe (as indicated by the CSR) in the GAD group than in the ANX group, t(55.57) = 
1.73, p = .089. Severity of primary diagnosis was therefore statistically controlled in the 
analyses for the second set of hypotheses.    
Preliminary Analyses 
One-way ANOVAs with group (GAD, ANX, NC) as the independent variable, 
and scores from each of the questionnaires as the dependent variables, revealed 
significant group differences for the PSWQ (F(2, 105) = 64.91, p < .001), the IUS 
(F(2,105) = 20.08, p < .001), the SPIN (F(2, 105) = 4.48, p = .014), the BSQ (F(2, 101) = 
3.69, p = .028), the ACQ (F(2, 105) = 9.73, p < .001), the STAI-T (F(2, 105) = 45.13, p < 
.001), and the BDI-II (F(2, 105) = 23.40, p < .001). Group differences were not found for 
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the PI-WSUR. Means and standard deviations for all measures in each group are 
presented in Table 1. Post hoc analyses showed that the GAD and ANX groups had 
similar scores on the IUS, SPIN, ACQ, and the STAI-T, but scored significantly higher 
than the CTRL group on these measures. As anticipated, the GAD group had 
significantly higher scores on the PSWQ than did the ANX group, who in turn had higher 
scores on the PSWQ than did the CTRL group. The GAD group also had a significantly 
higher score on the BSQ than did the CTRL group, although scores on the BSQ in the 
ANX group were not statistically different from those in the GAD and CTRL groups. As 
expected, the two clinical groups had significantly higher scores on the BDI-II than did 
the CTRL group; however, the GAD group had higher scores on the BDI-II than did the 
ANX group. Although this group difference suggests that the GAD group experienced 
more severe depressive symptoms than did the ANX group, it was decided not to control 
for BDI-II scores in all analyses due to the diagnostic overlap between GAD and major 
depression. Specifically, symptoms such as difficulty concentrating, being easily 
fatigued, and irritability are listed as diagnostic criteria for both major depression and 
GAD (APA, 2000).  
Additional analyses were conducted to assess the validity of the diagnoses in the 
ANX group. Specifically, participants in each diagnostic category within the ANX group 
were compared to the remaining participants in the ANX and GAD groups on relevant 
questionnaires. The first analysis showed that participants with social phobia scored 
significantly higher on the SPIN compared to those with other anxiety disorders, t(69) = -
7.13, p < .001 (Means = 42.58, 16.53). Next, compared to those with other anxiety 
disorders, individuals with panic disorder with or without agoraphobia scored higher on 
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the BSQ, t(65) = -2.03, p = .047 (Means = 42.93, 34.67), but not the ACQ t(69) = -.61, p 
= .54 (Means 27.07, 25.65). Lastly, those with OCD scored significantly higher on the 
total score of the PI-WSUR compared to individuals with other anxiety disorders, t(69) = 
-4.41, p <.001 (Means = 52.33, 20.45).  
Prior to the main analyses, statistical assumptions were assessed. Specifically, all 
variables were found to be normally distributed. In addition, linearity, homoscedasticity, 
and multicollinearity were assessed, and all statistical assumptions were met. 
   Hypotheses 1a and 1b 
To test the hypothesis that compared to the CTRL group, the two clinical groups 
would report more concern for all situation types of the AUSD, three hierarchical 
regressions were conducted (one for each situation type). Specifically, age and sex 
(female = 0, male = 1) were entered in the first step, and group (clinical = 0, CTRL =1) 
was entered in the second step. For concern about positive situations, age and sex 
accounted for 9.8% of variability, F(2, 102) = 5.52, p = .005, and group accounted for an 
additional 6.3% of variability, F∆(1, 101) = 7.61, p = .007. For concern about negative 
situations, age and sex accounted for 13.1% of variability, F (2,102) = 7.71, p = .001, and 
group accounted for an additional 12.2% of variability, F∆ (1,101) = 16.50, p <.001. For 
concern about ambiguous situations, age and sex accounted for 15.4% of variability, F(2, 
102) = 9.31, p < .001, and group accounted for an additional 16.8% of variability, F∆(1, 
101) = 24.95, p < .001. As noted in Table 2, the two clinical groups reported more 
concern for positive, negative, and ambiguous situations compared to the CTRL group. 
Standardized and unstandardized regression coefficients are presented in Table 3. 
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Similar regressions were conducted for positive, negative, neutral and ambiguous 
pictures. For ratings of positive pictures, age and sex accounted for 18.6% of variability, 
F(2, 103) = 11.75, p < .001, whereas group did not account for additional variability, 
F∆(1, 102) = .04, p = .836. For ratings of negative pictures, age and sex accounted for 
20.8% of variability, F(2, 103) = 13.49, p < .001, and group did not account for 
additional variability, F∆(1, 102) = 1.05, p = .308. For ratings of neutral pictures, age and 
sex explained 7.4% of variability, F(2, 103) = 4.15, p = .019, and group accounted for an 
additional 3.5% of variability, F∆(1, 102) = 3.98, p = .049. Lastly, for ratings of 
ambiguous pictures, age and sex accounted for 4.6% of variability, F(2, 103) = 2.49, p = 
.088, at the level of a statistical trend, and group explained an additional 8% of 
variability, F∆(1, 102) = 9.39, p = .003. As noted in Table 4, the two clinical groups rated 
neutral and ambiguous pictures as being less pleasant compared to the CTRL group. 
Standardized and unstandardized coefficients from the four regressions are presented in 
Table 3. 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b 
To test the hypothesis that compared to the ANX group, the GAD group would 
report more concern only for ambiguous situations (and not for positive or negative 
situations), three hierarchical regressions were conducted. In all analyses, age and sex 
were entered in the first step, severity of primary diagnosis was entered in the second 
step, and group (GAD = 0, ANX = 1) was entered in the third step. For concern about 
positive situations, age and sex accounted for 14.3% of variability, F(2, 66) = 5.50, p = 
.006, severity accounted for an additional 3.7% at the level of a statistical trend, F∆(1, 
65) = 2.94, p = .091, and group did not explain any additional variability, F∆(1, 64) = .24, 
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p = .624. For concern about negative situations, age and sex accounted for 12.2% of 
variability, F(2,66) = 4.56, p = .014, severity accounted for an additional 5.8% of 
variability, F∆(1, 65) = 4.57, p = .036, and group did not account for any additional 
variability, F∆(1, 64) = 1.08, p = .304. For concern about ambiguous situations, age and 
sex accounted for 18.1% of variability, F(2,66) = 7.31, p = .001, severity explained an 
additional 11.6% of variability, F∆(1,65) = 10.75, p = .002, and group did not explain 
any additional variability, F∆(1, 64) = .07, p = .798. Standardized and unstandardized 
coefficients from the three regressions are presented in Table 5. 
Similar regressions were conducted for positive, negative, neutral, and ambiguous 
pictures. For ratings of positive pictures, age and sex accounted for 18.9% of variability, 
F(2, 67) = 7.81, p = .001. Severity did not explain any additional variability, F∆(1, 66) = 
.03, p = .862, nor did group, F∆(1, 65) = .22, p = .641. For ratings of negative pictures, 
age and sex accounted for 25.4% of variability, F(2, 67) = 11.39, p < .001. Severity did 
not account for additional variability, F∆(1, 66) = .76, p = .388, nor did group, F∆(1, 65) 
= .467, p = .497. For ratings of neutral pictures, age and sex accounted for 16.9% of 
variability, F(2, 67) = 6.81, p = .002. Severity did not account for additional variability, 
F∆(1, 66) = 1.37, p = .246, and group explained an additional 12% of variability, F∆(1, 
65) = 11.28, p = .001. Lastly, for ratings of ambiguous pictures, age and sex did not 
account for any variability, F(1, 67) = 1.04, p = .358, nor did severity, F∆(1, 66) = 2.11, p 
= .152, whereas group accounted for an additional 12.5% of variability, F∆(1, 65) = 
10.01, p = .002. As seen in Table 4, the ANX group rated both neutral and ambiguous 
pictures as less pleasant compared to the GAD group. Standardized and unstandardized 
regression coefficients are presented in Table 5.  
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Hypotheses 3a and 3b 
To test the hypothesis that IU, state anxiety, and their interaction would each 
uniquely predict appraisals of ambiguous information, the three groups were collapsed 
and two hierarchical regressions were conducted with the scores from the IUS and SUDS 
entered in the first step, and their product entered in the second step. Ratings of 
ambiguous situations was the criterion variable in the first regression. The IUS and SUDS 
accounted for 44.5% of variability, F(2, 103) = 41.30, p < .001, however only the IUS 
was a significant predictor, β = .64, p < .05. The interaction term accounted for an 
additional 2.9% of variability, F∆(1, 102) = 4.93, p = .029. To understand this 
interaction, the regression equation (Y = .029(X) + .014(W) + -.000209(XW), where X = 
IUS, W = SUDS, and XW = interaction term) was solved for different levels of W (i.e., 
SUDS). More specifically, this regression equation was solved when W = 5.21, 31.30, 
57.39, and 83.47. These numbers represent 1 standard deviation (SD) below the mean, 
the mean, 1 SD above the mean, and 2 SDs above the mean of the SUDS. As seen in 
Table 6, as SUDS increases, the unstandardized coefficient of the IUS decreased. Lastly, 
the simple slopes shown in Table 6 were compared to a slope of 0. The slope representing 
1 SD below the SUDS mean (SUDS = 5.21) was statistically significant, while the 
remaining three slopes were not.   
Ratings of ambiguous pictures was as the criterion variable in the second 
regression. The IUS and SUDS accounted for 15.3% of variability, F(2, 105) = 9.46, p 
<.001, although only the IUS was a significant predictor, β = -.31, p < .05. The 





The first set of hypotheses was that compared to the non-clinical group, the two 
clinical groups would report more concern for all situation types, and would rate all 
picture types as less pleasant. These hypotheses were mostly supported. Specifically, 
compared to the non-clinical group, the two clinical groups reported more concern for all 
situation types of the AUSD, and rated ambiguous and neutral pictures as less pleasant. 
The second set of hypotheses was that compared to those with other anxiety disorders, 
individuals with GAD would report more concern only for ambiguous situations, and 
would rate only ambiguous pictures as less pleasant. These hypotheses were not 
supported. Individuals with GAD and those with other anxiety disorders reported similar 
levels of concern for ambiguous situations, and contrary to expectation, those with other 
anxiety disorders rated ambiguous pictures as less pleasant. The last set of hypotheses 
was that state anxiety, IU, and their interaction would each predict ratings of ambiguous 
situations and pictures. These hypotheses received partial support. With regard to 
ambiguous pictures, only IU (and not state anxiety, or the interaction between IU and 
state anxiety) predicted ratings in the expected direction where increases in IU were 
associated with decreased ratings of pleasantness. With regard to ambiguous situations, 
IU and state anxiety each predicted ratings in the expected direction, such that increases 
in IU and in state anxiety predicted increased ratings of concern for ambiguous situations. 
However, the interaction between IU and state anxiety predicted ratings of ambiguous 
situations in the opposite direction than what was expected. Dissecting the interaction 
revealed that state anxiety moderated the relationship between IU and ratings of 
ambiguous situations such that IU predicted ratings of ambiguous situations only at low 
levels of state anxiety.  
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Hypotheses 1a and 1b 
The finding that the two clinical groups reported more concern for negative, 
positive, and ambiguous situations compared to the non-clinical group is largely 
consistent with current conceptualizations of pathological anxiety. Specifically, compared 
to non-anxious individuals, anxious individuals tend to overestimate the cost of negative 
and ambiguous events (Mitte, 2007). This phenomenon is believed to contribute to the 
maintenance of pathological anxiety and is evident amongst individuals with social 
phobia (Foa, Franklin, Perry, & Herbert, 1996), obsessive-compulsive disorder (Woods, 
Frost, & Steketee, 2002), post-traumatic stress disorder (White, McManus, & Ehlers, 
2008), panic disorder with agoraphobia (McNally, & Foa, 1987), and GAD (MacLeod & 
Rutherford, 2004). Additionally, compared to non-anxious individuals, anxious 
individuals (particularly those with social anxiety) appraise positive events differently, in 
that they are perceived as being less positive (Laposa, Cassin, & Rector, 2010).  
The findings from the picture task were mixed in that compared to the non-
clinical group, the two clinical groups rated ambiguous and neutral pictures as less 
pleasant; however, they were not different from the non-clinical group in their ratings of 
negative and positive pictures. One possible explanation for this finding is that the 
negative and positive pictures used in the current study may have been too polarized in 
their respective categories to elicit differences between groups. For example, the negative 
pictures were rather extreme, with images including a plane crash, starving children, and 
mutilated bodies. It may be that when a picture exceeds a certain negativity threshold, 
appraisals will not differ as a function of anxiety (all individuals would typically rate the 
picture as very unpleasant). Similarly, the positive pictures used in this study may have 
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been “too positive”. Although research shows that anxious individuals, particularly those 
with social phobia, appraise positive events more negatively than do non-anxious 
individuals, the studies that have demonstrated this phenomenon have typically done so 
using stimuli that are less clearly positive than the stimuli used in the current study. For 
example, Alden, Taylor, Mellings, and Laposa (2008) found that individuals with social 
phobia endorsed negative interpretations of positive events more so than did non-anxious 
individuals. Importantly, the events used in their study are better characterized as 
„somewhat positive‟ rather than „completely positive‟. For example, the item “When 
people give signs that they like me…”  could have been more positive had it read “When 
people tell me that they like me…”. A minimal level of ambiguity may be necessary in 
order for differences in interpretations to emerge. Had the positive pictures used in the 
current study been less clearly and unambiguously positive, results might have resembled 
those of Alden and colleagues.  
A second possible explanation for this unexpected finding may relate to the use of 
pictorial stimuli. The bulk of research demonstrating the association between anxiety and 
the tendency to appraise positive events as less positive, and negative events as more 
negative, has employed diary-like tasks or social interactions, but not digital photographs 
(e.g., Alden et al., 2008; Butler & Mathews, 1983; Kanai, Sasagawa, Chen, Shimada, & 
Sakano, 2010; Laposa et al., 2010). Perhaps the ability to imagine oneself in the situation 
is necessary for an anxious individual to appraise the event as either more negative or less 
positive compared to a non-anxious individual. Viewing photographs of others or 
viewing unfamiliar scenes may have prevented participants from being able to experience 
the image as though it were occurring to them. Perhaps cognitive processing biases are 
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most evident for self-relevant situations (Rosmarin, Bourque, Antony, & McCabe, 2009). 
Conceivably, had idiographic images been used, wherein the individual views pictures of 
familiar and personally-relevant scenes, different results may have emerged on the 
picture task.  
Hypotheses 2a and 2b 
The second set of hypotheses, which addressed the more central goals of the 
study, was not supported. In the diary task, those with GAD showed similar levels of 
concern for ambiguous situations compared to those with other anxiety disorders. 
Although this finding is contrary to expectation, in retrospect it is not entirely surprising. 
Most research demonstrating specificity in terms of interpretation biases within the 
anxiety disorders has done so using tools designed to elicit group differences. For 
example, the Body Sensations Interpretation Questionnaire (BSIQ; Clark et al., 1997) 
was developed to demonstrate that individuals with panic disorder perceive panic related 
ambiguity more negatively than individuals with other types of anxiety (Clark et al.). The 
BSIQ consists of four types of ambiguous events that were selected to highlight the 
similarities and differences of individuals with panic disorder compared to those with 
other anxiety disorders. The four types of ambiguous events of the BSIQ include: (1) 
ambiguous panic sensations; (2) ambiguous social events; (3) ambiguous general events; 
and (4) other ambiguous symptoms. As expected, studies using this questionnaire 
typically reveal that individuals with panic disorder select the negative interpretation of 
the ambiguous panic sensations events more often, and rate these negative interpretations 
as more believable compared to individuals with other anxiety disorders and non-clinical 
controls (Austin & Richards, 2006; Clark et al.). 
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The AUSD was not developed to differentiate individuals with GAD from those 
with other anxiety disorders, but rather to assess interpretations of ambiguity regardless 
of anxiety type. For example, the AUSD contains fourteen ambiguous situations, 5 of 
which are socially ambiguous. Importantly, individuals with GAD are not expected to 
interpret socially ambiguous situations more negatively than would individuals with 
social phobia. Considering that 37.5 % of individuals in the ANX group had a primary 
diagnosis of social phobia, it is possible that group differences were not evident due to 
the substantial amount of socially ambiguous situations in the AUSD. Subsequent to data 
collection for the current study, an extended version of the AUSD (AUSD-EX: Koerner 
& Dugas, 2008) was developed. This newer version includes 33 ambiguous situations 
which relate to 11 common worry themes among individuals with GAD. For example, 
Koerner and Dugas included ambiguous situations relating to academic/work 
performance, health, and finances. Therefore, it is possible that individuals with GAD 
would report more concern than individuals with other anxiety disorders on the 
ambiguous situations of the AUSD-EX given its coverage of the various worry domains 
present in GAD.  
Another possible explanation for the similar interpretations of ambiguous 
situations between the two clinical groups related to the levels of IU observed in the two 
groups. Although the two clinical groups differed in expected ways on disorder specific 
symptoms (e.g., the GAD group reported higher levels of worry compared to others, and 
those with panic disorder reported more fear of bodily sensations compared to others), 
individuals in the GAD and ANX groups had similar levels of IU. Given that IU appears 
to play an important role in the interpretation of ambiguous information (Dugas et al., 
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2005; Koerner & Dugas, 2008), it is possible that the similar levels of IU in the two 
clinical groups may have led to similar interpretations of ambiguous situations. One 
reason that was considered for the similar levels of IU in the two clinical groups had to 
do with the fact that 40% of individuals in the ANX group had a secondary subclinical 
diagnosis of GAD. This suggests that individuals in the ANX group suffered from some, 
but not all symptoms of GAD. Although one might conclude that these subclinical GAD 
symptoms accounted for the higher levels of IU in the ANX group, a comparison of IUS 
scores of individuals in the ANX group with secondary GAD symptoms to those in the 
ANX group without secondary GAD symptoms showed almost identical means (63.54 
vs. 63.23 respectively). Furthermore, results from the second hypotheses remained even 
when individuals with secondary GAD symptoms were excluded from the analyses. 
Therefore, it does not appear that subclinical symptoms of GAD in the ANX group can 
account for the similar levels of IU in both clinical groups. An alternate potential reason 
for the similar levels of IU in the two clinical groups is that IU may be characteristic of 
most anxiety disorders. Although earlier research suggested that IU is specific to GAD 
(Ladouceur et al., 1999), recent research suggests that individuals with compulsive 
checking problems (Tolin, Abramowitz, Brigidi, & Foa, 2003) and with analogue social 
phobia (Carleton, Collimore, & Asmundson, 2010) experience similar levels of IU 
compared to those with GAD.  Future research should examine the specificity of IU more 
fully given the inconsistent findings across studies.  
Unexpectedly, individuals in the ANX group rated ambiguous pictures as less 
pleasant than did those in the GAD group. This suggests that the tendency to perceive 
pictorial ambiguity negatively may be more pronounced in those with other anxiety 
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disorders than it is in those with GAD. Considering that pictorial stimuli are rarely used 
to assess interpretation biases, future research is required to assess whether or not this 
finding is replicable. 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b 
Contrary to expectation, state anxiety moderated the relationship between IU and 
appraisals of ambiguous situations such that IU predicted ratings of ambiguous situations 
only at low levels of state anxiety. Generally speaking, cognitive theories posit that 
fundamental beliefs (or schemas) relate to biased processing and symptoms (Clark & 
Beck, 2010); accordingly, it was proposed that when accompanied by symptoms of 
anxiety, maladaptive beliefs would result in more biased processing. Surprisingly, results 
from this study point to the exact opposite; that when accompanied by greater symptoms 
of anxiety, IU does not lead to biased processing. Perhaps, when anxiety is high, the 
impact of beliefs on information processing is in some way “masked” by the greater 
impact of intense anxious arousal. Given that this is the first study to explore the 
interaction between beliefs about uncertainty and anxiety symptoms, and their relation to 
cognitive processing, the nature of this interaction requires further study.  
Another unexpected finding was that state anxiety was not a predictor of 
appraisals of ambiguous situations or pictures. This finding stands in contrast to nearly all 
research conducted in this area showing that elevated anxiety leads to biased processing 
(MacLeod & Cohen, 1993). As discussed below, it is probable that this null finding is 
attributable to the measure used to assess state anxiety (i.e., SUDS) and is likely not a 




A number of limitations in the current study are noted. Firstly, our measure of 
state anxiety (SUDS), while practical, is not ideal for statistical analyses, specifically 
regression analyses. Given that the SUDS is a 1-item measure, internal consistencies are 
not calculable. In regression analyses, predictor and criterion variables are presumed to 
have excellent internal consistency (Osborne & Waters, 2004). Given that the SUDS was 
used in regression analyses for the third set of hypotheses, results should be interpreted 
with caution. Secondly, while power to detect effects was adequate for the first two 
hypotheses, power was arguably not sufficient for the third set of hypotheses. 
Specifically, to detect an interaction with a small or medium sized effect, a sample size 
greater than 200 is recommended (Whisman & McClelland, 2005). It is possible that the 
sample size of 108 for the third set of hypotheses may have been insufficient to detect 
actual effects, should they exist.  
Recent research has begun to examine the value of incorporating cognitive 
modification training paradigms into treatments for anxiety in the hope of incrementing 
treatment efficacy. Specifically, attention modification paradigms where individuals are 
trained to allocate their attention to a neutral stimulus as opposed to a threat-related 
stimulus, and interpretation modification paradigms where individuals are trained to 
interpret ambiguous information in a more neutral manner (as opposed to a threat-related 
manner) have received initial support as means of reducing symptoms of anxiety (Amir et 
al., 2009; Amir, Bomyea, & Beard, 2010; Hayes, Hirsch, Krebs, & Mathews, 2010). 
Considering that this area of research is expanding rapidly, it seems that the role of 
maladaptive beliefs in relation to biased processing has not received adequate research 
attention. This study was an attempt to begin to fill this research gap by investigating the 
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processes involved in the interpretation of information, which may ultimately serve to 
refine treatment protocols that are currently in use. Given that IU was shown to be 
particularly important in the appraisals of ambiguous situations and pictures, the role of 
maladaptive beliefs as they relate to cognitive processing biases warrants inclusion in 
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Table 1  
Means and Standard Deviations for Self-Report Measures in GAD, ANX, & CTRL 
Groups 
 
 GAD ANX CTRL 





  48.60 (9.76)
b

































  25.47 (7.59)
a





  50.39 (9.87)
a





  12.03 (7.39)
b





Note.  Means with differing subscripts are statistically different  (p < .05),  GAD = 
Generalized anxiety disorder group; ANX = Other anxiety disorders (social phobia, 
obsessive-compulsive disorder, panic disorder with or without agoraphobia) group; 
CTRL = Control group; PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; IUS = Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Scale; PI-WSUR = Padua Inventory Washington State University Revision; 
SPIN = Social Phobia Inventory; BSQ = Body Sensations Questionnaire; ACQ = 
Agoraphobic Cognitions Questionnaire; STAI-T = State Trait Anxiety Inventory Trait 





Means and Standard Deviations for Ratings of Concern from the AUSD 
 
 GAD ANX CTRL 
Situation Type M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
 
Positive 1.78 (.72) 2.01 (.91) 1.49 (.56) 
Negative 3.53 (.67) 3.14 (.54) 2.69 (.56) 
Ambiguous 2.94 (.68) 2.83 (.69) 2.14 (.49) 
 
Note. AUSD = Ambiguous Unambiguous Situations Diary; GAD = Generalized anxiety 
disorder group; ANX = Other anxiety disorders (Social phobia, obsessive-compulsive 
disorder, panic disorder with or without agoraphobia) group; CTRL = Control group; 1 = 





Unstandardized & Standardized Regression Coefficients from the AUSD and APRT 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Criterion  AUSD APRT 
Variable  Predictor B SE B  β B SE B β 
 
 
Positive Age -.001 .006 -.020 .025* .008 .286 
 Sex .508* .145 .321 -.704* .194 -.325 
 Group -.426* .154 -.267 -.043 .207 -.020 
Negative Age .013* .005 .227 -.021* .007 -.299 
 Sex -.118 .123 -.083 .560* .154 .320 
 Group -.532* .131 -.371 .169 .165 .095 
Neutral Age    .009* .003 .307 
 Sex    -.102 .066 -.144 
 Group    .141* .071 .198 
Ambiguous Age .013* .005 .223 -.007 .005 -.117 
 Sex .236
a
 .123 .157 -.010 .128 -.008 
 Group -.656* .131 -.434 .419* .137 .300 
 
 
Note. AUSD = Ambiguous Unambiguous Situations Diary; APRT = Affective Picture 
Rating Task; Coding: Sex: female = 0, male = 1; Group: Clinical groups = 0, Non-clinical 
group = 1; * p < .05, 
a





Means and Standard Deviations for Ratings of Pleasantness in the APRT 
 
 GAD ANX CTRL 
Situation Type M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
 
Positive 7.67 (.85) 7.26 (1.11) 7.23 (1.12) 
Negative 1.67 (.46) 2.04 (.91) 2.19 (1.01) 
Ambiguous 4.32 (.61) 4.12 (.65) 4.72 (.63) 
Neutral 5.16 (.31) 4.86 (.30) 5.11 (.34) 
 
Note. APRT = Affective Picture Rating Task, GAD = Generalized anxiety disorder 
group, ANX = other anxiety disorders (Social phobia, obsessive-compulsive disorder, 
panic disorder with or without agoraphobia) group, CTRL = Control group, 1 = Very 







Unstandardized & Standardized Regression Coefficients from the AUSD and APRT 
________________________________________________________________________
______ 
Criterion  AUSD APRT 
Variable  Predictor B SE B  β B SE B β 
 
 
Positive Age .002 .008 .037 .026* .010 .325 
 Sex .554* .222 .322 -.665* .267 -.319 
 Severity .178
a
 .100 .213 .038 .121 .037 
 Group .114 .232 .070 .131 .280 .066 
Negative Age .015* .006 .280 .024* .007 -.411 
 Sex -.022 .174 -.016 .527* .184 .351 
 Severity .135
a
 .079 .205 -.086 .084 -.117 
 Group -.189 .182 -.147 -.132 .193 -.092 
Neutral Age    .006
a
 .003 .215 
 Sex    .035 .084 .050 
 Severity    -.085* .038 -.244 
 Group    -.297* .089 -.440 
Ambiguous Age .018* .006 .331 -.016* .006 -.325 
 Sex .331
a
 .172 .230 .228 .168 .175 
 Severity .248* .078 .353 -.187* .076 -.290 
 Group .046 .180 .034 -.558* .176 -.449 
Note. AUSD = Ambiguous Unambiguous Situations Diary; APRT = Affective Picture 
Rating Task; Coding: Sex: Female = 0, Male = 1; Group: Generalized anxiety disorder 
group = 0, other anxiety disorder group = 1, * p < .05, 
a








Level Score Regression Equation SE t 
 
+2SD 83.474  Ŷ = .01147X + 2.06 .0510 .23 
+1SD 57.387 Ŷ = .01695X + 1.70 .0352 .48 
Mean 31.3 Ŷ = .02243X + 1.34 .0196 1.15 
-1SD 5.213  Ŷ = .02791X + .97 .0054 5.15* 
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INFORMATION 
 
1. Nature et objectif de l’étude 
 
Nous savons aujourd‟hui que les personnes atteintes de troubles anxieux ont 
certains biais dans leur façon de traiter l‟information provenant de leur 
environnement. Par exemple, les personnes anxieuses tendent à porter leur 
attention plus rapidement à certains « signes de danger » et à interpréter 
certaines situations ambiguës de façon menaçante. Par contre, nous ne savons 
pas s‟il existe des différences au niveau du traitement de l‟information entre les 
personnes atteintes de différents troubles anxieux. En d‟autres mots, est-ce que 
toutes les personnes anxieuses réagissent de façon semblable à l‟information 
provenant de leur environnement ou est-ce que la façon de réagir dépend du 
trouble anxieux particulier dont souffre la personne? 
 
Le but de cette étude est d‟évaluer et de comparer le traitement de 
l‟information chez les personnes atteintes de différents troubles anxieux. Plus 
particulièrement, nous voulons utiliser des tâches informatiques pour comparer 
le traitement de l‟information chez les personnes atteintes du trouble d‟anxiété 
généralisée à celui des personnes atteintes des autres troubles anxieux et à celui 
des personnes non anxieuses. 
 
Un total de 165 adultes participeront à cette étude. Plus précisément, nous 
recruterons 55 personnes présentant un diagnostic primaire de trouble 
d‟anxiété généralisée, 55 personnes présentant un diagnostic primaire d‟un 
autre trouble anxieux (phobie sociale, le trouble panique et le trouble 
obsessionnel compulsif) et 55 personnes non anxieuses. Les 110 participants 
cliniques (groupes 1 et 2) seront recrutés à la Clinique des troubles anxieux de 
l‟Hôpital du Sacré-Cœur de Montréal tandis que les 55 participants non 
cliniques (groupe 3) seront recrutés à l‟aide d‟annonces placées dans les 
journaux locaux. 
 
2. Déroulement de l’étude et méthodes utilisées 
 
Cette étude comporte deux étapes : (1) l’évaluation détaillée de vos difficultés; 
et (2) l’administration de tâches informatiques et de questionnaires qui ont 
pour but d’évaluer votre façon typique de traiter l’information (par exemple, 
votre façon de porter attention à certains mots ou votre façon d’interpréter 
certaines situations).  
 




Si vous acceptez d’être inclus dans l’étude, vous participerez d’abord à une 
entrevue diagnostique d’environ une heure avec un(e) des psychiatres de 
l’équipe (Dr Savard, Dre Gaudet ou Dre Turcotte).  Cette entrevue préliminaire 
nous permettra d’évaluer si vous semblez remplir les critères de sélection de 
l’étude.  Si tel est le cas, vous participerez à une deuxième entrevue 
diagnostique d’environ une heure et demie avec une psychologue de notre 
équipe (Renée Leblanc ou Amélie Seidah). Suite à l’entrevue, vous répondrez 
à cinq brefs questionnaires qui ont pour but d’évaluer vos symptômes 
d’anxiété. Cela vous prendra environ 15 minutes pour répondre aux 
questionnaires. La durée totale de cette rencontre (entrevue, pause et 
questionnaires) sera d’environ deux heures. Si la deuxième évaluation 
confirme que vous remplissez les critères d’inclusion pour l’étude, vous serez 
alors invité(e) à poursuivre votre participation. 
 
Deuxième étape : Une rencontre pour compléter des tâches informatiques et 
questionnaires 
 
Si vous acceptez de poursuivre votre participation à l’étude, vous serez alors 
convoqué(e) à une dernière rencontre pendant laquelle vous ferez des tâches 
d’attention et d’interprétation sur un ordinateur et répondrez à des 
questionnaires. En ce qui concerne les tâches informatiques, vous ferez une 
tâche évaluant votre façon de porter attention à certains mots et deux tâches 
évaluant votre façon de comprendre certaines situations. Chacune des trois 
tâches prend environ 20 minutes à compléter. Vous répondrez ensuite à cinq 
brefs questionnaires qui ont pour but d’évaluer votre état général. Cela vous 
prendra environ 15 minutes pour répondre aux questionnaires.  La durée totale 
de cette rencontre (directives, tâches informatiques, pause et questionnaires) 
sera d’environ une heure et demie. 
 
3. Risques, effets secondaires et désagréments 
 
Il n‟est pas impossible que certaines tâches ou certains questionnaires 
provoquent un léger malaise à court terme (possiblement en vous faisant 
réfléchir à vos difficultés).  Par contre, ces tâches et questionnaires ont déjà été 
utilisés à plusieurs reprises auprès des personnes anxieuses et les malaises sont 
rares.  Si cela vous arrive, nous vous prions d‟en discuter avec la 
professionnelle de recherche ou avec votre thérapeute. 
 
4. Bénéfices et avantages 
 
Votre participation à cette étude vous permettra de recevoir une évaluation plus 
poussée et approfondie de vos difficultés. Parallèlement, en participant à cette 
50 
 
étude, vous pourrez contribuer à l‟avancement des connaissances dans le 
domaine des troubles anxieux. 
 
5. Autres moyens thérapeutiques possibles 
 
Cette étude porte strictement sur l‟évaluation de votre problème d‟anxiété (et 
non le traitement). Si vous décidez de ne pas participer à cette étude, votre 
traitement à la Clinique des troubles anxieux ne sera aucunement affecté. 
 
6. Versement d’une indemnité 
 




Tous les renseignements recueillis à votre sujet au cours de l‟étude 
demeureront strictement confidentiels, dans les limites prévues par la loi, et 
vous ne serez identifié(e) que par un code.  Aucune publication ou 
communication scientifique résultant de cette étude ne renfermera quoi que ce 
soit qui puisse permettre de vous identifier. 
 
Cependant, à des fins de contrôle du projet de recherche, votre dossier pourra 
être consulté par une personne mandatée par le comité d‟éthique de la 
recherche de l‟Hôpital du Sacré-Cœur ainsi que par des représentants de 
l‟organisme de subvention (Instituts de recherche en santé du Canada).  Tous 
ces organismes adhèrent à une politique de stricte confidentialité. 
 
8. Indemnisation en cas de préjudice 
 
Si vous deviez subir quelque préjudice que ce soit suite à votre participation à 
cette étude, vous recevrez tous les soins médicaux nécessaires, sans frais de 
votre part. Toutefois, ceci ne vous empêche nullement d‟exercer un recours 
légal en cas de faute reprochée à toute personne impliquée dans l‟étude. 
 
En acceptant de participer à cette étude, vous ne renoncez à aucun de vos droits 
ni ne libérez les chercheurs, l‟organisme subventionnaire (Instituts de 
recherche en santé du Canada) ou les établissements impliqués de leurs 
responsabilités légales et professionnelles. 
 
9. Participation volontaire et retrait de l’étude 
 
Votre participation à cette étude est volontaire.  Vous êtes donc libre de refuser 
d‟y participer.  Vous pouvez également vous retirer de l‟étude à n‟importe quel 
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moment, sans avoir à donner de raisons, en faisant connaître votre décision au 
chercheur ou à l‟un des membres de l‟équipe de recherche.  Toute nouvelle 
connaissance acquise durant le déroulement de l‟étude qui pourrait affecter 
votre décision de continuer d‟y participer vous sera communiquée sans délai. 
 
Votre décision de ne pas participer à l‟étude ou de vous en retirer n‟aura 
aucune conséquence sur les soins qui vous seront fournis par la suite ou sur vos 




10. Personnes à contacter 
 
Si vous avez des questions à poser au sujet de cette étude ou s‟il survient un 
incident quelconque ou si vous désirez vous retirer de l‟étude, vous pouvez 
contacter en tout temps le Dr Michel Dugas (le chercheur principal de l‟étude) 
aux numéros de téléphone suivants :  
 
Lundi, mardi, jeudi et vendredi : (514) 848-2424, poste 2215 (Département 
de psychologie, Université Concordia)  
Mercredi : (514) 338-4201 (Clinique des troubles anxieux, Hôpital du Sacré-
Cœur) 
 
Si vous voulez poser des questions à un professionnel ou à un chercheur qui 
n‟est pas impliqué dans cette étude, vous pouvez communiquer avec Dr 
Norman Lussier, omnipraticien à la Clinique des troubles anxieux, au (514) 
338-4201. 
 
Si vous avez des questions à poser concernant vos droits en tant que participant 
à un projet de recherche, ou si vous avez des plaintes ou des commentaires à 
formuler, vous pouvez communiquer avec la direction générale de l‟hôpital, au 











Le traitement de l’information chez les personnes atteintes d’un trouble 
anxieux 
 
La nature de cette étude, les procédés à utiliser, les risques et les bénéfices que 
comporte ma participation à cette étude ainsi que le caractère confidentiel des 
informations qui seront recueillies au cours de l‟étude m‟ont été expliqués. 
 
 
J‟ai eu l‟occasion de poser toutes mes questions concernant les différents aspects 
de cette étude et on y a répondu à ma satisfaction. 
 
 
Je reconnais qu‟on m‟a laissé le temps voulu pour prendre ma décision. 
 
 
J‟accepte volontairement de participer à cette étude.  Je demeure libre de m‟en 
retirer en tout temps sans que cela ne nuise aux relations avec mon médecin ou les 
autres intervenants et sans préjudice d‟aucune sorte. 
 
 
Je recevrai une copie signée de ce formulaire d‟information et de consentement. 
 
 
________________________   ________________________    __________ 
Nom du sujet                              Signature                                    Date 
(en lettres moulées) 
 
 
________________________   ________________________    __________ 
Nom du chercheur                      Signature                                    Date 
ou de son représentant 
(en lettres moulées) 
 
 
________________________   ________________________    __________ 
Nom du témoin                          Signature                                     Date             
(en lettres moulées)
Hôpital  
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Formulaire de consentement de participation à une recherche 
 
 
Par la présente, je déclare consentir à participer à une étude menée par Dr Michel Dugas du 
département de psychologie de l‟Université Concordia (514-848-2424, poste 2246; 
anxiety@alcor.concordia.ca). 
 
A. OBJECTIF DE L’ÉTUDE 
 
On m‟a informé que le but de cette étude est d‟évaluer et de comparer le traitement de l‟information 
chez trois groupes de personnes, soit (1) auprès de personnes atteintes du trouble d‟anxiété 
généralisée, (2) auprès de personnes présentant d‟autres troubles anxieux, et (3) auprès de personnes 
non anxieuses. 
  
B. PROCÉDURE (DÉROULEMENT DE L’ÉTUDE ET MÉTHODES UTLISÉES) 
 
Cette étude comporte deux étapes : (1) l‟évaluation de vos expériences anxieuses par l‟entremise 
d‟une entrevue; et (2) l‟administration de tâches informatiques et de questionnaires qui ont pour but 
d‟évaluer votre façon typique de traiter l‟information (par exemple, votre façon de porter attention à 
certains mots ou votre façon d‟interpréter certaines situations). La durée de chacune de ces étapes est 
d‟environ une heure, pour une durée totale d‟environ deux heures. Chaque participant(e) recervra une 
compensation de 20 $.  
 
Tous les renseignements recueillis auprès des participant(e)s au cours de l‟étude demeureront 
strictement confidentiels, dans les limites prévues par la loi, et les participant(e)s ne seront 
identifié(e)s que par des codes.  Aucune publication ou communication scientifique résultant de cette 
étude ne renfermera quoi que ce soit qui puisse permettre d‟identifier les participants. 
 
C.  RISQUES ET AVANTAGES 
 
Il est possible que certaines tâches ou certains questionnaires provoquent un léger malaise à court 
terme.  Par contre, ces tâches et questionnaires ont déjà été utilisés à plusieurs reprises auprès des 
personnes anxieuses et nonanxieuses et les malaises sont rares. Si cela vous arrive, nous vous prions 
d‟en discuter avec la professionnelle de recherche.  
 
En participant à cette étude, vous pourrez contribuer à l‟avancement des connaissances dans le 
domaine des troubles anxieux. 
 
D. CONDITIONS DE PARTICIPATION 
 
- Je comprends que ma participation à cette étude est volontaire. Je suis donc libre de refuser d‟y 
participer. Je peux également me retirer de l‟étude à n‟importe quel moment, sans conséquence pour 
moi et sans avoir à justifier pourquoi. Je dois seulement faire connaître ma décision au chercheur ou à 
la professionnelle de recherche. 
 
- Je comprends que ma participation à cette étude est CONFIDENTIELLE. 
 
- Je comprends que les données de cette étude pourront être publiées, mais d‟aucune façon mon 
identité sera dévoilée. 
 
- Je comprends le but de la présente étude ;  je sais qu‟elle ne comprend pas de motifs cachés dont je 




J‟AI LU ATTENTIVEMENT CE QUI PRÉCÈDE ET JE COMPRENDS LA NATURE DE 
L‟ENTENTE. JE CONSENS LIBREMENT ET VOLONTAIREMENT À PARTICIPER À CETTE 
ÉTUDE. 
 







Si vous avez des questions concernant vos droits en tant que participant(e) à l‟étude, S.V.P. contactez 
Adela Reid, Agente d‟éthique en recherche/conformité, Université Concordia, au 514-848-2424 poste 








































































































































































































































































































































1. Sur une échelle de 0 à 100, ou 0 représente aucune anxiété et 100 représente 
une anxiété extrême, quel est votre niveau d‟anxiété en ce moment? 
 
Niveau d‟anxiété : _______________ 
 
2. Sur une échelle de 0 à 100, ou 0 représente aucune tristesse et 100 représente 
une tristesse extrême, quel est votre niveau de tristesse en ce moment? 
 
Niveau de tristesse : _______________ 
 
 
3. Sur une échelle de 0 à 100, ou 0 représente aucune irritabilité et 100 
représente une irritabilité extrême, quel est votre niveau d‟irritabilité en ce 
moment? 
 
Niveau d‟irritabilité : _______________ 
 
 
4. Sur une échelle de 0 à 100, ou 0 représente aucun bien-être et 100 représente 
un bien-être extrême, quel est votre niveau de bien-être en ce moment? 
 
Niveau de bien-être : _______________ 
 
 
5. Sur une échelle de 0 à 100, ou 0 représente aucune fatigue et 100 représente 
une fatigue extrême, quel est votre niveau de fatigue en ce moment? 
 
Niveau de fatigue : _______________ 
 
                                                 
 
